"Quite apart from the malallocations which are the result of political pressures, an administrative agency which attempts to perform the function normally carried out by the pricing mechanism operates under two handicaps. First of all, it lacks the precise monetary measure of benefit and cost provided by the market. Second, it cannot, by the nature of things, be in possession of all the relevant information possessed by the managers of every business which uses or might use radio frequencies, to say nothing of the preferences of consumers for the various goods and services in the production of which radio frequencies could be used." - R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J LAW & ECON 1 (1959), p. 18.
The title of this post is of course tongue-in-cheek, but it is still interesting to come across what seems to be a prominent Chicagoan's appreciation of the fact that Mises's and Hayek's arguments against central planning are complementary, but different (not to mention the fact that they are both clearly distinguished from the public-choice-style agency problems).